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Abstract 
 
The paper investigates the behavior of loan loss provisions during election years in Nigeria. Election events 
create uncertainties in the business environment in Nigeria which can increase the credit risk that banks 
face. The findings reveal that the banking sector had high loan loss provisions when it is under-capitalised 
during election years. However, the election year did not have a significant effect on the level of loan loss 
provisions in the Nigerian banking sector. 
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1. Introduction 
The objective of this paper is to investigate the behaviour of loan loss provisions in the Nigerian banking 
sector. Loan loss provisions (LLPs) are used to mitigate expected loan losses arising from bank lending 
(Curcio and Hasan, 2015; Leventis et al, 2011). The size of loan loss provisions reported in the financial 
statement of banks can have signaling effects on the asset quality of banks (Ozili and Outa, 2018). In 
Nigeria, the size of loan loss provisions in banks are significantly influenced by credit risk considerations, 
prudential regulation requirements and accounting standards (Ozili and Outa, 2019).  
In addition to credit risk, there are other risk factors that banks take into account. One of such risk factor is 
the impact of elections on banks’ ability to recover loans from politically-connected obligors as well as the 
effect of elections on banks’ ability to conduct business in the election year (Ozili, 2020), and this is called 
the election year effect. According to Ozili (2020), the “election-year effect’ is a country risk factor which 
banks take into account if banks believe that a change in the current government following general elections 
may affect their ability to recover loans from politically-connected obligors. Such banks will keep 
additional provisions to mitigate credit risk arising from the ‘election year’ effect.  
Surprisingly, the banking literature has not examined the characteristics of bank financial reporting during 
the election year despite the fact that banks are often the largest borrowers to fund election campaigns in 
most countries and in Nigeria, and there is the risk that the loans issued to election campaigners may not be 
repaid in full, or at worst, will be written off. Due to this concern, this is the first study to examine the effect 
of election events on the characteristics of bank financial reporting in emerging economies, particularly, 
Nigeria. In this study, I focus on the impact of the election year on the level of loan loss provisions in the 
Nigerian banking sector. 
The empirical results show that there is a negative and significant association between LLP and bank capital 
during election years which implies that loan loss provisions are higher when the banking sector is under-
capitalised especially during election years. This finding supports the capital management hypothesis. The 
capital management hypothesis states that banks will increase loan loss provisions when they have low 
capital in order to compensate for their low capital levels, and banks will keep fewer loan loss provisions 
when they have sufficient (or high) capital (Curcio and Hasan, 2015; Ozili and Thankom, 2018). The 
findings also reveal that the election year did not have a significant effect on banking sector provisioning. 
This study makes two contributions to the literature. Firstly, this study contributes to the literature that 
investigate the influence of external and institutional factors on bank financial reporting behaviour (e.g., 
Ozili, 2019; Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005; Laeven and Majnoni, 2003; Ozili, 2020). By controlling for 
election year effect, political stability and level of corruption, insights were provided to understand how 
unique factors in a country can influence the behaviour of loan loss provisions in banks. Secondly, this 
study examines loan loss provisioning behaviour in the banking sector of a country that, arguably, has non-
transparent general elections, and a country that is prone to economic fluctuations (i.e., booms and 
recessions) due to its exposure to crude oil prices. This therefore provides a natural setting to test the effect 
of election events on banks’ financial reporting, focusing on loan loss provision in this study. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the relevant literature. 
Section 2 develops the hypotheses. Section 3 presents the data, model specification and empirical methods. 
Section 4 discuss the empirical results. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
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2. Literature review 
In the literature, Balla and Rose (2015) examine the relationship between earnings and loan loss 
provisioning at the time when the US SEC1 tightened accounting constraints following the SEC's 1998 
SunTrust Bank decision. The findings show that the positive association between earnings and loan loss 
provisions weakened for publicly-held banks but not for privately-held banks shortly after the SEC action, 
which is consistent with reduced earnings management among publicly-held banks only. Ozili (2020) 
examine the impact of the election-year on banks’ loan loss provisioning behaviour using a cross country 
sample, and find that the banking sectors have high provisions during election years because banks 
anticipate a higher number of default from politically connected borrowers and also anticipate default that 
may arise from election uncertainties. 
Also, some country-specific studies report some determinants of the level of loan loss provisions. For 
instance, in the United States, Morris et. al., (2016) examine the economic determinants and value relevance 
of US banks’ loan loss provisions during the global financial crisis. They find that discretionary provisions 
are used for income smoothing and signaling when the two incentives reinforce each other, but income 
smoothing occurs more frequently. Kanagaretnam et. al., (2005) show that US banks use loan loss 
provisions to signal information about banks future prospects but the propensity to use provisions for 
signaling purposes is greater among smaller banks. In Italy, Caporale et. al., (2018) examine the 
determinants of loan loss provisions among 400 Italian banks during 2001 to 2015. They find that loan loss 
provisions in Italian banks were significantly influenced by the non-discretionary components of loan loss 
provisions; however, the procyclicality of loan loss provisions was less pronounced for local banks because 
their loans were well collateralised and their behaviour was more strongly affected by supervisory activity. 
In China, Wang et. al., (2019) examine whether bank loan loss provisions affect credit fluctuation in China’s 
banking system, and find that non-discretionary loan loss provisions have a significant impact on credit 
fluctuation whereas discretionary loan loss provisions have no significant impact on credit fluctuation for 
Chinese banks.  
In South Africa, Ozili and Outa (2018) show that South African banks do not use loan loss provisions to 
smooth income when they are: under-capitalised, have large non-performing loans and have a moderate 
ownership concentration; however, using LLPs to smooth income is pronounced when South African banks 
are more profitable during economic boom years, when they are well-capitalised and is pronounced among 
banks that adopt International Financial Reporting System (IFRS) and have a Big 4 auditor. In Poland, 
Borsuk (2019) conducted a set of stress test scenario to determine how different economic scenarios would 
affect loan loss provisions among other financial ratios. Borsuk find that economic growth, the labour 
market, and market interest rates have a significant influence on the loan loss provision ratio of banks in 
Poland. Although the literature has examined the behavior of LLP in several contexts, the extant literature 
has not examined the behaviour of bank financial reporting during election years, particularly the behaviour 
of loan loss provisions in election years. 
In Nigeria, Ozili and Outa (2019) examine whether banks in Nigeria use loan loss provisions to smooth 
income during mandatory IFRS adoption in Nigeria, to determine whether mandatory IFRS adoption 
increased or decreased income smoothing among Nigerian banks. They find that the mandatory adoption 
of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in Nigeria was associated with reduced earnings 
                                                          
1 Securities and Exchange Commission 
4 
 
smoothing among Nigerian banks, which suggest that mandatory IFRS adoption discouraged the use of 
loan loss provisions for income smoothing, while Ozili (2015) find that Nigerian banks used loan loss 
provisions for income smoothing and capital management purposes, but not for signaling purposes, during 
the voluntary adoption of IFRS in Nigeria. In an African study, Ozili (2019) show that using loan loss 
provisions for income smoothing purposes is more pronounced in African countries that have high levels 
of corruption and in politically unstable African countries. Overall, the empirical literature has not 
examined the effect of election events on bank financial reporting in Nigeria. 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1. Data 
Financial data for Nigeria was obtained from the World Bank database. The sample period is from 2003 to 
2016 and is sufficient to cover at least 4 general election cycles. Data for real gross domestic product growth 
rate was collected from the World Economic Forum archived in the World Bank database, while 
institutional data was collected from the World Governance Indicators database of the World Bank’s 
database. See Appendices A1 for descriptive statistics of the sample data and the variable descriptions. 
3.2. Methodology 
The baseline model is specified below, which is adapted from the models used in Curcio and Hasan (2015) 
and Ozili (2019). 𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑡 =  𝑐 + 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑡 +  𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑡 +  𝐶𝐶𝑡 +  𝑃𝑆𝑡 +  𝐸𝐿𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑡 +  𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡 +  𝑒 
Where, LLP = loan loss provisions to gross loans; NPL = ratio of nonperforming loans to gross loans; CAR 
= ratio of total regulatory capital to total risk-weighted assets (%); ELECT = a binary variable that equal 
one in election year and zero in non-election year; ∆GDP = real domestic product growth rate; CC = control 
of corruption index; PS = political stability/ absence of terrorism index; t = year. See Appendix for detail 
variable description.  
A positive sign for the ELECT coefficient is expected if banks anticipate that a change in the current 
government following general elections will make it difficult to recover their loans from politically-
connected obligors, and banks would respond to this by keeping higher provisions in the election year. Prior 
studies control for other determinants of loan loss provisions (see Ahmed et. al, 1999; Ozili and Outa, 2017). 
The first variable is nonperforming loan (NPL). Banks will keep higher provisions when they expect high 
loan defaults (Laeven and Majnoni, 2003; Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005); thus, a positive sign is predicted 
for NPL coefficient. The second variable is the capital management (CAR) variable. CAR controls for 
capital management incentive to influence provisions estimates. Banks with low capital levels tend keep 
higher provisions to compensate for their low capital levels and vice versa, and this describes the capital 
management hypothesis (Ozili and Outa, 2017); thus, a negative relationship is predicted for CAR 
coefficient. The third variable is the real gross domestic product growth rate (ΔGDP) which control for 
bank provisioning behaviour that depends on the state of the economic cycle. Bank provisions are generally 
higher during recessionary periods and relatively lower during economic booms (Laeven and Majnoni, 
2003, Ozili, 2018); implying a negative relationship between ΔGDP and LLP. Next, two institutional factors 
were introduced (the corruption control (CC) indicator and the political stability (PS) indicator) that play a 
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significant role during elections in Nigeria. High corruption levels and political instability are considered 
to be detrimental to general elections (Dupas and Robinson, 2012; Callen and Long, 2015). For the PS 
variable, a negative relationship between LLP and PS is expected because banks in politically unstable 
environments will keep higher provisions especially higher general provisions to mitigate credit risk in 
unstable political environments. For the CC variable, a positive relationship between LLP and CC is 
expected because banks in less corrupt environments tend to keep fewer general provisions (where general 
provisions are the smaller component of total provisions). 
 
4. Results 
4.1. Regression Results 
The results are reported in Table 1. The variables of interest are the ELECT coefficient and the coefficient 
of the interaction variables. The ELECT coefficient is statistically insignificant in all models (1) to (6). The 
ELECT*CAR coefficient is negative and statistically significant, indicating that bank provisions are higher 
when the banking sector is under-capitalised during election years. Also, the ELECT*NPL, ELECT*PS, 
ELECT*CC and ELECT*∆GDP coefficients are statistically insignificant, hence no meaningful conclusion 
can be drawn. 
(insert table 1 here) 
4.2. Correlation analysis 
In the Pearson correlation results in Table 2, the focus is on the correlation between the loan loss provisions 
(LLPs) and the election year (ELECT) variable which tells us whether election years are associated with 
higher (or fewer) provisions in the Nigerian banking sector. The correlation analysis shows that the 
correlation between LLP and the ELECT is statistically insignificant, indicating that there is no significant 
correlation between bank provisions and election years. As can be observed, loan loss provisions (LLP) is 
significantly correlated with regulatory capital ratio (CAR) and business cycle (∆GDP). However, CAR is 
negatively correlated with LLP while ∆GDP is positively correlated with LLP. This indicates that lower 
regulatory capital levels are associated with higher loan loss provisions in the Nigerian banking sector, 
while higher loan loss provisions are associated with periods of economic prosperity (i.e., positive GDP 
growth). However, loan loss provisions (LLP) is not significantly correlated with corruption control (CC) 
and political stability (PS) variable although PS is positively correlated with LLP while CC is negatively 
correlated with LLP. 
(insert table 2 here) 
4.3. Descriptive statistics 
The mean values of the variables are reported in Table 3. The mean value of the LLP ratio is 8.02 which 
is much lower than the NPL ratio and indicates that bank provisions is lower than the level of 
nonperforming loans (NPLs) during the period of analysis. The standard deviation of NPL and LLP 
shows that the NPLs had higher variability than LLPs in the Nigerian banking sector. Also, the mean of 
the regulatory capital ratio (CAR) is higher than the means of LLP and NPL which suggest that the 
Nigerian banking sector has sufficient regulatory capital to mitigate expected losses. The CAR variable 
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has lower variability than NPL and LLP which indicate the regulatory capital ratio of the Nigerian 
banking sector is relatively stable 
(insert table 3 here) 
 
5. Conclusion 
The behaviour of bank loan loss provisions during election years in Nigeria was examined. The main 
message of this paper is that, although there was no significant direct impact of election year on bank 
provisioning in Nigeria, loan loss provisions are higher when the banking sector is under-capitalised, 
especially during election years. One implication of the findings is that political events, such as elections, 
may affect other accounting numbers in banks. Secondly, bank supervisors should understand how election 
events might affect banks’ loan portfolio in their assessment of the appropriate level of regulatory 
provisions that banks should keep. One idea is to require banks to increase its stock of ‘general provisions’ 
in election years to act as a cushion to mitigate expected and unexpected losses arising from election and 
post-election events. It is recommended that future research should investigate other national events that 
can affect the stability of the Nigerian banking sector. Future research may also focus on the effect of 
elections on bank provisioning in microfinance banks. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1: Provisioning during election years 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
c 0.554 
(0.06) 
0.269 
(0.03) 
-15.871 
(-1.86) 
-1.425 
(-0.13) 
0.109 
(0.01) 
-1.49 
(-0.17) 
NPL -2.281 
(-1.51) 
0.675*** 
(11.29) 
0.779*** 
(19.15) 
0.667*** 
(9.33) 
0.668*** 
(9.87) 
0.694*** 
(15.19) 
CAR -0.208* 
(-2.23) 
-0.202* 
(-2.27) 
0.016 
(0.18) 
-0.190 
(-1.61) 
-0.203 
(-1.61) 
-0.175* 
(-2.58) 
ELECT 0.688 
(0.91) 
0.866 
(0.85) 
12.093* 
(2.36) 
7.318 
(0.66) 
-0.532 
(-0.06) 
1.446 
(1.32) 
∆GDP 0.205*** 
(4.82) 
0.199** 
(3.15) 
0.231*** 
(7.98) 
0.226** 
(3.20) 
0.210* 
(2.77) 
0.191** 
(3.46) 
CC -2.281 
(-1.51) 
-2.681 
(-1.19) 
-0.924 
(-0.65) 
-0.937 
(-0.36) 
-1.910 
(-0.67) 
-3.398 
(-1.56) 
PS 0.543 
(0.17) 
0.692 
(0.18) 
-6.044* 
(-1.79) 
-0.998 
(-0.19) 
0.166 
(0.03) 
0.495 
(0.15) 
ELECT*NPL  -0.024 
(-0.20) 
    
ELECT*CAR   -0.593* 
(-2.42) 
   
ELECT*PS    3.428 
(0.61) 
  
ELECT*CC     -1.083 
(-0.13) 
 
ELECT*∆GDP      0.939 
(0.40) 
R2 99.55 99.56 99.78 99.58 99.55 99.59 
Adjusted R2 99.02 99.79 99.40 98.86 98.78 98.88 
F-statistic 186.21 128.93 261.62 137.93 128.36 140.56 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000 0.0002 0.00004 0.0001 0002 0.0001 
Durbin Watson 2.49 2.46 3.40 2.63 2.57 2.32 
    Akaike information 
criterion  
2.85 3.34 2.31 2.95 3.02 2.93 
Estimations are based on ordinary least squares (OLS) regression.  ‘White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors & 
covariance’ is applied to correct for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. NPL = ratio of nonperforming loans to gross loans: 
the lower the better; CAR = ratio of total regulatory capital to total risk-weighted assets (%); ELECT = a binary variable that 
equal one in election year and zero in non-election year. ∆GDP = real gross domestic product growth rate; CC = control of 
corruption index: the higher the better; PS = political stability/ absence of terrorism index: the higher the better; t-statistics is 
reported in parenthesis. *,**, *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels . 
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Table 2: Correlation Matrix 
        
        
       
Variables NPL  LLP  CAR  CC  PS  ELECT  ∆GDP  
NPL  1.000       
         
         
        
LLP  0.977*** 1.000      
 (14.51)        
 ((0.00))        
        
CAR  -0.710*** -0.712*** 1.000     
 (-3.19) (-3.21)       
 ((0.01)) ((0.01))       
        
CC  0.005 -0.131 -0.103 1.000    
 (0.014) (-0.41) (-0.32)      
 ((0.99)) ((0.68)) ((0.74))      
        
PS  0.240 0.251 0.348 -0.293 1.000   
 (0.782) (0.82) (1.17) (-0.97)    
 ((0.45)) ((0.43)) ((0.26)) ((0.35))    
        
ELECT  -0.157 -0.170 0.421 -0.145 0.345 1.000  
 (-0.50) (-0.54) (1.46) (-0.46) (1.16)    
 ((0.62)) ((0.59)) ((0.172)) ((0.65)) ((0.27))    
        
∆GDP  0.368 0.526* -0.083 -0.524* 0.389 -0.139 1.000 
 (1.25) (1.95) (-0.26) (-1.94) (1.33) (-0.44)   
 ((0.23)) ((0.07)) ((0.79)) ((0.08)) ((0.21)) ((0.66))   
        
Estimations are based on Pearson correlation analysis. T-statistics are reported in single parenthesis. P-values are reported in double parenthesis. 
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics for all variables from 2003 to 2016 
 NPL LLP CAR CC PS ELECT ∆GDP 
 Mean  12.16  8.02  15.55 -1.14 -1.94  0.28  7.53 
 Median  9.30  4.20  17.47 -1.14 -1.97  0.00  6.28 
 Maximum  37.30  27.90  23.40 -0.89 -1.63  1.00  33.73 
 Minimum  2.95  0.00  1.75 -1.36 -2.21  0.00 -1.61 
 Std. Dev.  10.13  8.51  6.41  0.13  0.16  0.46  8.06 
 Observations  13  14  12  14  14  14  14 
 
 
 
Appendix 
A1: Variable Description 
Indicator  Short definition Source 
∆GDP Change in Gross Domestic Product in 
percentage 
World Bank national accounts data, 
and OECD National Accounts data 
files. 
CAR The capital adequacy of deposit takers. It is a 
ratio of total regulatory capital to its assets held, 
weighted according to risk of those assets. 
Financial Soundness Indicators 
Database (fsi.imf.org), International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) 
NPL Ratio of defaulting loans (payments of interest 
and principal past due by 90 days or more) to 
total gross loans (total value of loan portfolio). 
The loan amount recorded as nonperforming 
includes the gross value of the loan as recorded 
on the balance sheet, not just the amount that is 
overdue. 
Financial Soundness Indicators 
Database (fsi.imf.org), International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) 
PS Political stability and absence of terrorism index World Governance Indicator database 
CC Control of corruption index World Governance Indicator database 
 
